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This paper investigates the impact of the macroeconomy on the health insurance coverage of Americans.
We examine panel data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) for 2004-2010,
a period that includes the Great Recession of 2007-09.  We find that a one percentage point increase
in the state unemployment rate is associated with a 1.67 percentage point (2.12%) reduction in the
probability that men have health insurance; this effect is strongest among college-educated, white,
and older (50-64 year old) men.  For women and children, the unemployment rate was not significantly
correlated with the probability of health insurance coverage through any source.  When one examines
the source of coverage, it becomes apparent that a one percentage point increase in the unemployment
rate is associated with a 1.37 percentage point (4.69%) higher probability that a child is covered by
public health insurance.  Based on the point estimates in this paper, we estimate that 9.3 million adult
Americans, the vast majority of whom were men, lost health insurance due to a higher unemployment
rate alone during the 2007-09 recession.  This is roughly nine times more than lost health insurance
during the previous (2001) recession.  We conclude with a discussion of how components of recent
health care reform may influence these relationships in the future.
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The number of Americans lacking health insurance has long been a concern of 
policymakers, for a number of reasons.  The uninsured tend to receive less medical care and thus 
be in worse health than the insured (Finkelstein et al 2011, Card et al., 2009; Doyle, 2005; also 
see the reviews in McWilliams, 2009 and Freeman et al., 2008).  Moreover, uninsured 
individuals are at risk of severe financial loss, including bankruptcy, in the event of illness 
(Gross and Notowidigdo, 2011; Himmelstein et al., 2009).  Concerns about the adverse 
consequences of uninsurance led the U.S. Congress, in March 2010, to establish a variety of 
incentives for employers to offer health insurance and for individuals to enroll in such plans, and 
to expand eligibility for public health insurance.  
The high and rising cost of providing public health insurance is a budgetary concern for 
the federal and state governments, which have been hit by rising expenditures in public health 
insurance programs (Chernew et al., 2009).  This strain on budgets rises with the number of 
people covered by Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (henceforth just 
Medicaid) during macroeconomic downturns, a consequence of the social safety net. According 
to the U.S. Census Bureau, Medicaid covered 15.9 percent of the U.S. population in 2010, up 
from 13.2 percent in 2007 (DeNavas –Walt el al., 2008, 2011), although it is not known to what 
extent this was due to the recession or longer-run trends.  
In December of 2007, an economic expansion that began in November 2001 ended, and a 
recession began that lasted until June 2009 (NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee, 2011).  
With a duration of 18 months, it was the longest recession in the United States since 1933.   It 
was also the most severe recession in the United States since World War II; from peak to trough, 
employment fell by 6.3% and output fell by 5.1% (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 2011).    3 
 
Figure 1 shows both the duration and severity (in terms of employment) of the 2007-09 recession 
relative to other postwar recessions.   
This paper estimates the impact of the macroeconomy on the number of Americans with 
health insurance coverage, both overall and by source of coverage.  By focusing on the recession 
of 2007-09, this paper extends and builds on previous work that has examined the impact of the 
macroeconomy on uninsurance during the previous (2001) recession (Cawley and Simon, 2005). 
It also contributes to the larger economics literature on the consequences of the 2007-09 
recession, which has been dubbed the Great Recession (e.g. Farber, 2011; Hurd and Rohwedder, 
2010). 
While there is a large literature on the direct effect of the macroeconomy on health (e.g. 
Ruhm 2003; Ruhm 2000), there is relatively little published on the impact of the macroeconomy 
on health insurance.  Cawley and Simon (2005) examined the relationship between state 
unemployment rate and the probability of health insurance coverage in the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP) and estimated that 984,000 Americans, nearly all of whom were 
adult men, lost health insurance due to macroeconomic conditions during the 2001 recession.    
Gilmer and Kronick (2009) use data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1980 to 
2008 to project that the Great Recession could increase the number of uninsured Americans by 
6.9 million, but their model (which focuses on the influence of per capita health spending, 
income, demographics and time trends) does not take into account the focus of this paper, the 
unemployment rate. While there are annual national estimates of the percent and number of 
Americans who are uninsured (e.g. Fronstin, 2011; DeNavas-Walt et al., 2011) there has been no 
analysis of how health insurance coverage was impacted by increases in the unemployment rate 
around the time of the Great Recession.  Trends in annual data may reflect the continuing long 4 
 
term decline in generosity of health insurance (Vistnes et al 2010). Our method of analysis 
identifies the impact of worsening macro-economic conditions measured by the state monthly 
unemployment rate, within a longitudinal survey, that allows us to investigate the heterogeneity 
of impact by demographic characteristics. 
The relationship between unemployment rates and the probability of insurance coverage 
is likely to change over time in response to changes in health insurance markets and public health 
insurance programs; as a result, estimates from earlier papers may be out of date.  For example, 
there have been declining trends (since the peaks reached in 2000) in both employer offers of 
health insurance (Vistnes et al., 2010) and employees covered through employer-sponsored 
insurance (Fronstin 2011); these secular changes may have altered the relationship between the 
unemployment rate and health insurance.  Moreover, each recession has distinct characteristics 
that may imply a different relationship between the unemployment rate and coverage.  For 
example, the 2007-09 recession was characterized by a drop in home prices, which may have 
inhibited unemployed workers from moving to areas with more job opportunities, a phenomenon 
that some have called “house lock” (Ferreira et al 2011).  Likewise, extensions of the maximum 
duration of unemployment insurance benefits from 26 to up to 99 weeks in some states may have 
decreased the incentives for unemployed workers to quickly find new employment (although a 
recent evaluation of these expansions finds small effects on re-employment; see Rothstein, 
2011).  Another relevant change is that, in 2009, Congress instituted 65 percent subsidies for 
premiums associated with coverage through the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1985 (COBRA); this legislation gives qualifying workers and their families who would 
otherwise lose their health insurance the option to temporarily extend that coverage.   The new 
subsidy is available for a maximum of 15 months to those who lost jobs between September 5 
 
2008 and May 2010 (US DOL 2011b). By making it easier for newly unemployed workers to 
continue on the health insurance plan of their former employer, these subsidies are likely to 
weaken the correlation between the unemployment rate and health insurance.  
For these reasons, the relationship between the macroeconomy and health insurance 
found in older data may not apply to the Great Recession. In addition, the Great Recession was 
characterized by considerable variation in unemployment rates across states and over time, 
providing researchers with more power to accurately estimate the effect of the macroeconomy on 
health insurance.   The purpose of this paper is to exploit that variation to generate accurate and 
up-to-date estimates of the impact of unemployment rates on health insurance coverage, both 
overall and by source of coverage, and for the entire population as well as for specific subgroups 
defined by gender, education, and age. 
 
Conceptual framework 
Our measure of the macroeconomy is the state unemployment rate, which is consistent 
with the previous literature on this topic (e.g. Cawley and Simon, 2005; Marquis and Long, 
2001), as well as the literatures on the effect of the macroeconomy on health (e.g. Ruhm, 2003; 
Ruhm 2000) and health behaviors (e.g. Charles and DeCicca, 2008; Ruhm, 2005; Ruhm, 2002) 
There are several mechanisms by which a high unemployment rate can result in the loss 
of employer-provided coverage. A high state unemployment rate is, by definition, associated 
with a higher probability that a resident of that state is unemployed. When those who were 
previously covered by employer-provided health insurance lose their jobs, they (and any 
dependents on the same policy) are likely to lose coverage from the former employer. Although 
COBRA allows eligible unemployed workers to temporarily purchase health insurance through 6 
 
their former employers, take-up rates are low because of the high cost (Collins, 2011, Lambrew, 
2001).  
High unemployment rates may lower the probability of employer-provided coverage even 
among those who remain employed. When labor demand shifts in because of a poor 
macroeconomy, total labor compensation will fall. If wages are costly to renegotiate, employers 
may reduce compensation by shifting a greater share of health insurance costs to employees. 
Elasticity estimates suggest that this mechanism should result in little decline in coverage; 
among those offered employer-sponsored health insurance, take-up falls by less than one-tenth of 
a percent when premiums increase by one percent (Chollet and Liu, 2006).  Due to decreased 
labor demand, previously full-time workers may have their hours reduced to the point that they 
are no longer eligible for health insurance benefits.  At the extreme, employers may react to a 
poor macroeconomy by ceasing to offer health insurance (Marquis and Long, 2001).  
The lower labor income that accompanies higher unemployment rates could also have an 
income effect, reducing private purchases of individual health insurance.  On the other hand, 
some people might gain health insurance coverage during periods of high unemployment if their 
incomes fall to a level that qualifies for Medicaid. Holahan and Garrett (2009), using CPS data 
from 1990-2003, estimate that an increase in unemployment of one percentage point would 
expand coverage through Medicaid by 0.2 percentage points for non-elderly adults  and by 0.79 
percentage points for children.  
Based on this framework and the existing literature, we hypothesize that an increase in 
the unemployment rate decreases the probability of coverage through one’s own employer.  We 
predict that an increase in the unemployment rate increases the probability of coverage through 
public health insurance.   We hypothesize that, on net, unemployment rate is negatively 7 
 
correlated with the probability of health insurance coverage through any source for adults, but 
that for children the sign of the net effect is ambiguous.   
 
Methods 
We estimate logit models in which the dependent variables are: an indicator variable for 
whether one has health insurance coverage through any source, an indicator for whether one 
receives health insurance coverage through one’s own employer, and an indicator for whether the 
individual is covered by government-provided health insurance.  The regressor of interest is state 
monthly unemployment rate. Models also control for respondent age, marital status, education, 
and family size.  
All models control for both individual-specific and year-specific fixed effects; our 
identification of the effect of state unemployment rate on the probability of health insurance 
coverage comes from variation within people over time in deviations of the state unemployment 
rate from the national mean for that year. The research design requires that we control for year 
fixed effects because even before the recession, health care costs were rising (Chernew et al., 
2009), employer offers of health insurance were declining (Vistnes et al., 2010), and the 
percentage of Americans covered by employer-sponsored insurance was falling (Fronstin, 2011).  
Because our data contain multiple observations of the same person over time, we are also able to 
include person fixed effects so that our estimates are not influenced by any time invariant 
unobserved characteristics that affect health insurance status. In subsequent models we control 
for employment status in order to examine the pathways by which the macroeconomy acts on 
insurance status.    8 
 
After first estimating a model for men and women pooled, we estimate models separately 
by gender because labor force participation and attachment and eligibility for publicly provided 
health insurance may differ by gender; for example, low-income pregnant women are eligible for 
Medicaid coverage. Men and women also tend to differ in the extent to which they have 
dependent coverage available through a spouse. We also examine whether the relationship 
between unemployment rate and insurance coverage differs across age, education, and 
race/ethnic group.    
Following standard practice, we cluster standard errors by state to account for the fact 
that individual outcomes are regressed on state-level measures of the macroeconomy. When a 
micro economic outcome is regressed on an aggregate regressor, unadjusted standard errors will 
be biased downwards, perhaps dramatically (Moulton, 1990). A related concern is serial 
correlation in standard errors for observations within states over time (Bertrand et al., 2004). We 
adjust for these issues by bootstrapping the standard errors within our logit specifications, 
selecting with replacement all observations in a particular state. We conduct 50 replications to 
estimate the bootstrap standard errors, using the range suggested in Efron and Tibshirani (1993). 
As expected, this adjustment considerably increases the standard errors. 
 
Data: The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 
The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) is a nationally representative 
sample of Americans over the age of 15 that consists of a series of panels that are up to 4 years in 
length with sample sizes ranging from approximately 12,000 to 40,000 households. The SIPP, 
which started in 1984, interviews households at 4-month intervals; thus, there exist up to 12 
interviews for each individual.  Although each SIPP interview collects data on the current month 9 
 
and, retrospectively, each of the 3 months between interviews, we use only the contemporaneous 
reports in order to avoid recall error. 
This paper uses data from the 2004 and 2008 panels of the SIPP covering the period 
January 2004 through November 2010, and covering all 50 states plus the District of Columbia.  
There are special considerations for each of these panels.  The sample for the 2004 panel was cut 
in half in September 2006 in response to budgetary pressures.  The 2008 panel is still in the field 
at the time of this writing, so only 7 waves of those data are available. 
Each SIPP wave contains information on the respondent’s insurance coverage and the 
source of their coverage, for a particular month. We study the following outcomes in the SIPP: 
an indicator variable for whether one has health insurance coverage through any source, an 
indicator for whether one receives health insurance coverage through one’s own employer, and 
an indicator for whether the individual is covered by government-provided health insurance (e.g. 
Medicaid or SCHIP). 
The SIPP contains a wide variety of demographic and socioeconomic variables.  In each 
regression, we control for the following characteristics that may influence insurance status: 
highest grade completed, age, number of children in the family, marital status, indicator variables 
for each individual, and indicator variables for each year. We exclude income from the set of 
regressors because wages and salary are determined simultaneously with fringe benefits such as 
health insurance. 
The SIPP data are better suited to our research question than data from the CPS, which is 
another household survey with state identifiers that is available in the public domain. CPS data 
are the basis of the standard annual estimates of health insurance coverage in the U.S. population 
(DeNavas Walt et al 2011).  However, the CPS only records whether the respondent was covered 10 
 
by health insurance at any point in the past 12 months, making it impossible to determine 
whether the CPS respondent had coverage in any specific month.  In contrast, the SIPP records 
an individual’s insurance status in specific months, which enables one to match insurance status 
to the unemployment rate in that month.  Another advantage is that the SIPP is longitudinal 
(whereas the CPS is cross-sectional); this feature enables us to estimate fixed effects models that 
eliminate the bias that would otherwise be caused by individual-specific, time-invariant 
heterogeneity. 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area Unemployment Statistics Series is the source 
for monthly state unemployment rates. Unlike in the previous years, when certain small states 
were not separately identified, the 2004 and 2008 panels of the SIPP identify state of residence 
for individuals in all 50 states plus the District of Columbia.  These state identifiers are used to 
merge state monthly unemployment rates to the SIPP data. We control for individual and year 
fixed effects, so our identifying variation of unemployment on health insurance coverage is 
within people over time in deviations from the national mean for that year. 
Our final estimation samples from the pooled 2004-2010 SIPP years consist of the 
following numbers of person-month observations: 467,285 for men, 510,334 for women, and 




Table 1 lists summary statistics for the sample.  On average during the time of our sample 
(January 2004-November 2010), the percent of respondents that were insured through any source 
was 78.6% for men, 83.0% for women, and 85.5% for children.  Men and women are roughly 11 
 
equally likely to be covered by employer-sponsored health insurance (63.0% vs. 62.6%) but men 
are more likely than women to have such coverage through their own employer (48.8% vs. 
36.5%).  Government health insurance programs are the source of coverage for 9.1% of men, 
13.3% of women, and 29.2% of children.   
Figure 2 shows changes in health insurance coverage for men, women and children by 
changes in the national unemployment rate.  (The analyses in this paper use state unemployment 
rate but for the sake of clarity and simplicity we depict the national unemployment rate in Figure 
2.)  The national unemployment rate experienced a steep increase, rising from approximately 6.1 
percent in August 2008 to approximately 10.1 percent in October 2009. Figure 2 indicates that as 
the unemployment rate rose in 2009, the percentage of the sample with health insurance 
coverage fell for men, remained roughly constant for women, and rose for children.    
Logit Regressions 
We initially estimate the probability that an individual has health insurance coverage as a 
function of the unemployment rate and basic demographic characteristics while excluding 
employment status, and then we re-estimate our models controlling for employment status in 
order to investigate the extent to which that variable is a mechanism by which the unemployment 
rate affects health insurance. Each cell of each of our tables contains, from top to bottom, the 
sample size, the logit fixed effects coefficient, the standard error in parentheses, the marginal 
effect italicized in brackets, and the mean of the dependent variable. 
The first set of rows in Table 2 presents results for all sample respondents under the age 
of 65 (i.e. children plus male and female adults). The results indicate that a one percentage point 
increase in the unemployment rate has no significant impact on the probability of being insured 
through any source.  However, when one looks by source of coverage one finds interesting 12 
 
differences.  A one percentage point increase in unemployment rate is associated with a 0.57 
percentage point reduction in the probability of coverage through one’s own employer.  This is 
almost exactly offset by a 0.56 percentage point increase in the probability of coverage through 
public insurance, but that point estimate is not statistically significant.   
These estimates, based on the pooled sample, may obscure differences across gender and 
age (i.e. adults and children).  Subsequent rows in Table 2 present results estimated separately 
for adult men, adult women, and children.  The second row of Table 2 corresponds to results for 
men, which are consistent with our hypotheses that higher unemployment rates are associated 
with a lower probability of health insurance coverage through any source, the man’s own 
employer, and for coverage through any employer.  Specifically, a one-percentage-point higher 
unemployment rate is associated with a 1.67 percentage point (2.12%) reduction in the 
probability of health insurance coverage through any source, a 1.01 percentage point (2.07%) 
reduction in the probability of coverage through the man’s own employer, and a 0.78 percentage 
point (1.24%) reduction in the probability of coverage through any employer.  The 
unemployment rate is not significantly associated with the probability of coverage through an 
employer as a dependent or through a government health insurance program. 
The third set of rows in Table 2, which correspond to women, indicate that there is no 
significant association between unemployment rate and health insurance coverage, either overall 
or through any specific source.  This is not simply a result of large standard errors; when one 
compares the marginal effects for men and women for coverage through any source or through 
an employer, in each case the marginal effects for women are half the size or smaller.  
The fourth and bottom set of rows in Table 2, which correspond to children, show that a 
one-percentage-point higher unemployment rate is associated with a 1.37 percentage point 13 
 
(4.69%) higher probability that a child is covered by government-provided health insurance.  
Although there is not a significant association between unemployment rate and the probability 
that a child is covered through any source, the sign of the marginal effect is positive.  These 
results confirm that government health insurance programs for children operate counter-
cyclically, as intended; when unemployment rates rise, and parents lose their jobs and family 
income declines, more children become enrolled in Medicaid and SCHIP, and as a result their 
health insurance status is not negatively affected.   
One important way that the macroeconomy affects individuals’ health insurance status is 
likely to be through their own employment status. For this reason, we measured the extent to 
which macroeconomic conditions are correlated with insurance status conditional on 
employment status. Specifically, we added indicator variables for current employment and for 
being unemployed to the set of regressors (being out of the labor force is the reference category).  
Results are presented in Table 3 for men (top set of rows) and women (bottom set of rows).  
Recall that without controlling for employment status, a one-percentage point rise in 
unemployment was associated with a 1.67 percentage point decrease in the probability of health 
insurance coverage for men. After controlling for employment status, the associated decrease is 
1.18 percentage points; the association of unemployment rate with employer-provided coverage 
(either through one’s own employer or through any employer) is no longer statistically 
significant, and the marginal effects fall by a third to a half.   
We also examine the reason that individuals are uninsured.  In the SIPP, adults who lack 
health insurance are asked the reasons they are uninsured; respondents are allowed to indicate 
more than one reason.  To examine whether the unemployment rate affects the reason that people 
are uninsured, we restrict our sample to those who lack health insurance, and keep only the first 14 
 
month in which the individual reports being uninsured.  We then estimate a series of logit models 
in which the dependent variable equals one if the respondent answers yes to a specific reason for 
being uninsured. The set of regressors includes the state monthly unemployment rate and the 
same regressors used in the earlier models, except for the exclusion of individual fixed effects 
and the inclusion of state fixed effects.   
Results are presented in Table 4.  For men, a one percentage point higher unemployment 
rate is associated with a 1.23 percentage point increase in the probability that uninsurance is due 
to cost.  A higher unemployment rate is also associated with lower probabilities that uninsurance 
is due to the following factors: insurance not being offered by an employer, the individual not 
being at the job long enough to qualify, and because insurance is not needed.  For women, a one 
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a 0.92 percentage point 
increase in the probability that uninsurance is due to cost, and a reduction in the probability that 
uninsurance is due to not being at the job long enough to qualify.  Overall, people are more likely 
to attribute uninsurance to excessive cost during periods of high unemployment. 
 
Extensions 
Recent economic studies have documented how the Great Recession differentially 
affected various groups in the population.  Elsby et al. (2010) find that unemployment during the 
Great Recession was particularly high among the less educated, ethnic minorities, and younger 
workers.  They conclude that these differences arise from differences in the probability of 
becoming unemployed, but that the likelihood of reemployment is similar across these groups.  
Farber (2011) finds that rates of job loss during the Great Recession were higher among younger 15 
 
and less educated workers, but that those of older workers and the better educated rose more than 
is typical during a recession.  
Previous research based on older time periods also suggests that the impact of the 
macroeconomy on health insurance coverage may differ by education.  For example, Glied and 
Jack (2003) examine CPS data for 1981-2002, converted to state-year-education group cells and 
find that unemployment rates affect health insurance coverage most for the highest educated.   
 As extensions, we conduct subgroup analyses by education, race, and age. We estimate 
the main models (those from Table 2, that do not control for employment status) for adults 
separately by education group: high school or less, some college, and bachelor’s degree or more; 
the results are shown in Table 5.  For men, a one percentage point rise in the unemployment rate 
is estimated to reduce the probability of coverage through any source by 1.73 percentage points 
for those with a high school education or less, 1.37 percentage points for those with some 
college, and 2.14 percentage points for those with a bachelor’s degree or more education.   
Although these differences are not statistically significant, the point estimates suggest that those 
with the lowest and highest levels of education were most likely to lose health insurance during 
the Great Recession. 
Among women, even when models are estimated separately by educational attainment, 
we continue to find that the unemployment rate is not significantly associated with the 
probability of insurance coverage; the exception is that a one percentage point rise in 
unemployment is associated with a 1.53 percentage point lower probability that women with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher education receive employer-sponsored insurance as a dependent.  16 
 
In other subgroup analyses, we estimate models separately by race (Table 6).  The impact 
of unemployment rate on the probability of coverage is not significantly different for whites 
compared to African-Americans and Hispanics (pooled), but the pattern of point estimates 
suggests that the unemployment rate has a larger impact on health insurance coverage for whites.  
A one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a 1.54 percentage 
point lower probability that an adult white male has coverage from any source, and a 0.95 
percentage point reduction in the probability that an adult African-American or Hispanic male 
has coverage through any source.  Among children, results indicate that whites are more likely to 
gain health insurance during periods of high unemployment (the estimate for African-Americans 
and Hispanics is positive, but smaller and not statistically significant). 
Results for the average worker may obscure interesting differences across age groups.  
For example, younger workers may be hit harder if the last hired is the first fired, and older 
workers may have a harder time finding new employment after being laid off.  We present 
results of models estimated separately by age group in Table 7.  Among men, a one percentage 
point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a decrease in the probability of 
coverage of 1.34 percentage points for men aged 18-34, 1.56 percentage points for men aged 35-
49, and 2.5 percentage points for men aged 50-64. Thus, the effect of unemployment rate on the 
oldest group (50-64) is nearly double that on the youngest group (18-34). The magnitudes of the 
marginal effects for women also rise monotonically with age, but are in no case statistically 
significant.   
These differences by education, race, and age could reflect several factors.  First, we use 
the overall state monthly unemployment rate, so the differences in impact we observe could 
simply reflect differences in the unemployment rate for each education, race, and age group.  In 17 
 
particular, the Great Recession led to greater job losses among workers who were less educated 
(Elsby et al., 2010; Farber, 2011), younger (Elsby et al., 2010; Farber, 2011), and ethnic 
minorities (Elsby et al., 2010). Second, these groups may differ in the time and money cost of 
achieving coverage.  
 
Discussion 
The Great Recession of 2007-09 is the longest and deepest macroeconomic downturn in 
the United States since 1933.  This paper documents the impact of higher unemployment rates on 
one important outcome: health insurance coverage.   
We find substantial heterogeneity in this relationship across gender, race, and age, as well 
as source of insurance.  For men, a one percentage point rise in the unemployment rate is 
associated with a 1.67 (2.12%) percentage point reduction in coverage through any source.  This 
impact for men is greatest among whites (relative to African-Americans and Hispanics) and 
older (50-64) individuals.  The age effect may be due to older workers being more likely to be 
laid off during periods of high unemployment, or having a harder time finding a new job after 
being laid off. 
In contrast to the findings for men, among women the unemployment rate is in almost no 
case significantly correlated with the probability of coverage, and the point estimates of the 
marginal effects are much smaller than those for men. For children, a higher unemployment rate 
is associated with a 1.37 percentage point (4.69%) higher probability of public health insurance 
coverage, with the result that there is no statistically significant effect on the probability of health 
insurance coverage through any source (the point estimate is positive).  Subgroup analyses 
indicate that health insurance coverage is most sensitive to the unemployment rate for white, as 18 
 
opposed to African-American and Hispanic, children.  Our findings for children confirm that 
government health insurance programs work counter-cyclically to protect children from losing 
health insurance during macroeconomic downturns. 
As hypothesized, the loss of employment is an important pathway through which a higher 
unemployment rate leads to a lower probability of health insurance coverage for men.  However, 
even controlling for employment status, men still face a 1.18 percentage point lower probability 
of coverage when the unemployment rate rises by 1 percentage point.   This may be due to 
employers dropping coverage, employers cutting hours such that some men no longer qualify for 
health insurance, employers raising workers’ share of the overall premium so more male workers 
decline coverage, or lower incomes that result in fewer purchases of individual coverage.  When 
the unemployment rate is high, the uninsured are more likely to report that their uninsurance is 
due to the high cost of coverage, which is consistent with employers shifting more of the 
premium to workers and lower family incomes being important mechanisms for the relationship 
between the unemployment rate and the probability of coverage. 
A logical comparison for these results are those of Cawley and Simon (2005), who 
examine SIPP data for 1990-2000.  They find that a one percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate was associated with a much smaller reduction in the probability that men 
have health insurance through any source: 0.7 percentage points versus the 1.67 percentage point 
effect found here (compare Cawley and Simon (2005) Table 1, row 1 column 1 to this paper’s 
Table 2, row 2 column 1).  They also found that a one percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate was predicted to decrease women’s coverage through an employer by 0.7 
percentage points (see their Table 2, row 1, column 2) whereas in the more recent data our 
corresponding estimate is half that size and not statistically significant (see Table 2, row 3, 19 
 
column 4).  They also find that a one percentage point increase in unemployment is associated 
with a 0.8 percentage point increase in the probability that a child is covered by public health 
insurance (see their Table 3, row 1, column 3); the corresponding estimate from the more recent 
data is 1.37 percentage points (see Table 2, row 4, column 5).   In summary, a comparison of the 
two time periods (1990-2000 to 2004-2010) indicates that the impact of the unemployment rate 
on health insurance coverage worsened for men, became less severe for women, and improved 
for children. 
This paper’s estimates of the correlation between health insurance coverage and 
unemployment rate during 2004-2010 can be used to estimate the number of Americans who lost 
health insurance during the Great Recession, which lasted from December 2007 until June 2009.  
During that period, the national unemployment rate rose from 5.0% to 9.5% (U.S. Department of 
Labor, 2011).
1 Based on this change, our regression results, and Census estimates of the U.S. 
population of men aged 18–64, women aged 18–64, and children under age 18 in the year 2008 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2011), we estimate that roughly 9.3 million adult Americans lost health 
insurance during the Great Recession.  This is the difference in the number of Americans who 
had health insurance coverage at the macroeconomic peak in December 2007 compared to the 
trough in June 2009; the number who ever lost health insurance during the Great Recession is 
undoubtedly higher due to the fact that there is churning in the ranks of the uninsured (Swartz, 
1994).  This macroeconomic impact fell much more heavily on men; the 9.3 million total 
includes 7.1 million men and 2.2 million women.  Thus, the Great Recession lived up to its 
name; for comparison, during the 2001 recession, we estimate that 984,000 adult Americans lost 
health insurance (the vast majority of whom were adult males).  The difference in estimates is 
                                                 
1 The national unemployment rate continued to rise after what the NBER classifies as the end of the 2009 recession 
(peaking at 10.1% in October 2009), but we consider the trough of the economy to be that determined by the NBER. 20 
 
driven by both a much greater increase in unemployment rate (a 4.5 percentage point increase 
during the Great Recession compared to a 1.3 percentage point increase during the 2001 
recession), and a much larger effect on men of each percentage point rise in unemployment.  In 
contrast to adults, our point estimates imply that 4.2 million children under the age of 18 gained 
health insurance during the Great Recession.   
We caution that the 95% confidence intervals around our aggregate estimates are very 
large; for men it ranges between 11.9 million and 2.4 million losing health insurance, for women 
it ranges between 5.2 million losing coverage and 0.9 million gaining it, and for children it 
ranges between 73,000 and 8.4 million gaining coverage.   
Our estimate that 9.3 million adult Americans lost health insurance during the Great 
Recession is similar to the calculation reported by the Commonwealth Fund (based on 
Commonwealth Biennial Health Insurance Surveys) that, between 2008 and 2010, 9 million 
adults lost health insurance following the loss of a job (Collins et al., 2011); however, our 
estimate also includes those who lost coverage without changing employment status.  Our 
estimate is also higher than that of Gilmer and Kronick (2009), who estimate, using a model that 
does not consider unemployment rate, that 6.9 million Americans lost health insurance during 
the Great Recession. 
In the future, the reforms passed by the U.S. Congress in the 2010 Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) will likely moderate the impact of the unemployment rate on the 
probability of insurance coverage. The PPACA offers incentives for employers to offer, and 
individuals to take up, coverage; provides subsidies for coverage of low-income families through 
public and private policies; and changes the regulation of health insurance prices in the 
individual market. Many features of the law are expected to cushion the impact of future 21 
 
recessions on health insurance coverage, particularly for adults. For example, the availability of 
well-functioning markets (“exchanges”) for individual insurance together with limits on raising 
premia with age could reduce the impact of recession on the health insurance status of older 
workers.   
One main feature of the PPACA is an expansion in Medicaid eligibility for adults living 
in families earning less than 133 percent of the poverty level. To provide suggestive evidence on 
how this provision may affect the future impact of the macroeconomy on health insurance 
coverage, we conducted a simple thought experiment. We re-estimated the main model for any 
insurance coverage (the results for which were reported in Table 2) for both men and women, 
after imposing the following condition: those adults who are uninsured and have incomes below 
133 percent of the federal poverty level are assumed to be covered by Medicaid. This is a gross 
simplification of what may happen in reality for several reasons. To keep our though experiment 
simple, we assume away any behavioral adjustments that may occur and assume full take-up by 
eligible adults. We also do not factor in the individual mandate, or changes that may result from 
subsidies for those whose family income is between 133 and 400 percent of the poverty line, 
which may change behavior among those who do not qualify for the Medicaid expansion.  
Compared to the original specification in Table 2 that showed a one percentage point 
increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a statistically significant 1.67 percent 
decrease in the probability of obtaining any coverage for men, under full take-up of the new 
Medicaid provisions of the PPACA, the impact of the unemployment rate on health insurance 
coverage for men is not statistically significant.  As the various components of the PPACA are 
implemented, it will become possible for researchers to more accurately simulate and test how 
reforming the current system of health insurance in the US will affect the association of the 22 
 
unemployment rate with the probability of uninsurance and the functioning of the social safety 
net. 
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Figure 2. Percentage of Men, Women and Children with Any Insurance Coverage, 
and National Unemployment Rate 
 
 
Notes: Source: 2008 SIPP panel, non elderly respondents, using only observations from the fourth reference months.28 
 
 
Table 1. Means of Key Variables
 
   Men  Women  Children 
Health Insurance Status 
Indicator: covered by any HI  0.786  0.830 0.855
Indicator: covered by own employer HI  0.488  0.365
Indicator: covered by employer HI as a dependent  0.142  0.261 0.478
Indicator: covered by employer HI (in own name or as a dependent)  0.630  0.626
Indicator: covered by government HI  0.091  0.133 0.292
Employment Status 
Indicator: employed  0.794  0.681
Indicator: unemployed  0.045  0.038
Indicator: not in a labor force  0.161  0.281
Unemployment Rate   
State monthly unemployment rate  6.571  6.563 6.497
Number of observations  467,285  510,334 416,648
 
Notes: Data: pooled 2004-2010 waves of the SIPP. The sample consists of: column 1:  all men between the ages of 18 and 64; 
column 2: all women between the ages of 18 and 64; column 3: all children under the age of 18.    29 
 
Table 2. Probability of Health Insurance Coverage 













ALL    (N=1,394,267) (N=977,619)  (N=1,394,267)  (N=977,619)  (N=1,394,267) 
unemployment rate    -0.0124 -0.0276 ** 0.0017 -0.0258 0.0227
  (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.021)
  [-0.0030] [-0.0057] [0.0004] [-0.0057] [0.0056]
mean of dependent variable  0.823   0.424   0.286 0.628 0.166
                    
MEN    (N=467,285) (N=467,285)  (N=467,285)  (N=467,285)  (N=467,285) 
unemployment rate    -0.0707 *** -0.0464 ***  0.0224 -0.0363 **  0.0061
  (0.023) (0.014) (0.030) (0.017) (0.034)
  [-0.0167] [-0.0101] [0.0056] [-0.0078] [0.0006]
mean of dependent variable 
 
0.786 0.488  0.142 0.630 0.091
 
WOMEN    (N=510,334) (N=510,334)  (N=510,334)  (N=510,334)  (N=510,334) 
unemployment rate    -0.0214 -0.0066 -0.0114 -0.0155 -0.0117
  (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.024)
  [-0.0050] [-0.0012] [-0.0025] [-0.0034] [-0.0025]
mean of dependent variable 
 
0.830 0.365  0.261 0.626 0.133
 
CHILDREN    (N=416,648) (N=416,648)  (N=416,648) 
unemployment rate    0.0533 0.0050 0.0550 *
  (0.033) (0.036) (0.029)
  [0.0126]  [0.0011]       [0.0137]  
mean of dependent variable  0.855      0.478       0.292  30 
 
 
Notes: (1) Cells of the table contain: coefficient, bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, and marginal effects in italics.  
(2) Superscripted notations next to the coefficients indicate the level of statistical significance from a two-tailed t-test. ***  denotes the 1% level, ** denotes the 5% level and * 
denotes the 10% level. 
(3) Bootstrapped standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
(4) Data: pooled 2004-2010 waves of the SIPP. The sample consists of : row 1: all non-elderly under the age of 65 (except columns 2 and 4: all non-elderly adults between the ages 
of 18 and 64 regardless of employment status); row 2;  all men between the ages of 18 and 64 regardless of employment status;  row 3: all women between the ages of 18 and 64 
regardless of employment status, and ;  row 4: all children under the age of 18.   
(5) Dependent variables—column 1: indicator variable that equals 1 if individual covered by health insurance from any source and 0 otherwise; column 2: indicator variable that 
equals 1 if individual is covered by employer health insurance in own name and 0 otherwise; column 3: indicator variable that equals 1 if individual is covered by employer health 
insurance as a dependent and 0 otherwise; column 4: indicator variable that equals 1 if individual is covered by employer health insurance either in own name or as a dependent 
and 0 otherwise; column 5: indicator variable for any type of government-provided health insurance. 
(6) Other regressors are individual fixed effects, year-specific fixed effects, highest grade completed, marital status, presence of children in the family, and age . 
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Table 3. Probability of Health Insurance Coverage 
Logit Regression (with person- and year-specific fixed effects) 
With controls for labor force status 
 
  









MEN  (N=467,285) (N=467,285) (N=467,285) (N=467,285) (N=467,285) 
unemployment rate  -0.0564 **  -0.0289 0.0205 -0.0206 0.0035
(0.021) (0.021) (0.032) (0.019) (0.032)
[-0.0118] [-0.0052] [0.0051] [-0.0049] [0.0006]
Indicator: employed  0.554 ***  1.916 ***  -0.255 ***  1.359 ***  -1.017 *** 
(0.042) (0.068) (0.049) (0.044) (0.061)
[0.121] [0.416] [-0.0636] [0.327] [-0.162]
Indicator:  unemployed  -0.623 *** -0.372 ***  -0.0164 ***  -0.395 *** -0.411 *** 
(0.031) (0.069) (0.061) (0.039) (0.060)
[-0.142] [-0.0719] [-0.0041] [-0.0965] [-0.0741]
WOMEN  (N=510,334) (N=510,334) (N=510,334) (N=510,334) (N=510,334) 
unemployment rate  -0.0139 0.0115 -0.0124 -0.0009 -0.0193
(0.020) (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.027)
[-0.0028] [0.0015] [-0.0030] [-0.0002] [-0.0048]
Indicator : employed  0.450 ***  2.261 ***  -0.357 ***  1.276 ***  -0.794 *** 
(0.025) (0.067) (0.037) (0.052) (0.045)
[0.0919] [0.417] [-0.0841] [0.293] [-0.193]
Indicator:  unemployed  -0.438 *** -0.130 ***  -0.120 ***  -0.350 *** -0.162 *** 
(0.040) (0.067) (0.048) (0.042) (0.046)




Notes: (1) See Notes (1)-(6) under Table 2.  
 (2) Model includes as regressors, in addition to variables listed under Note 6 of Table 2, an indicator for being employed, and an indicator for being unemployed . 
 (3) The means of dependent variables are the same as those in Table 2.  
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Table 4: Reason a Person is Uninsured, as a Function of the Unemployment Rate 
Logit Regression (with state- and year-specific fixed effects) 
 
  
  too expensive, 
can't  
  afford 
HI not offered 
by  
  employer 
not at job long  
  enough to 
qualify 





  time or temp 
haven't needed 
health  
  insurance 
MEN    (N=28,645) (N=28,645) (N=28,645) (N=28,645)  (N=28,645)  (N=28,645) 
unemployment rate    0.0795 **  -0.0883 ** -0.108 ***  0.0210 -0.0004 -0.128 ***
  (0.030) (0.040) (0.036) (0.037) (0.047) (0.037)
  [0.0123] [-0.0142] [-0.0082] [0.0011] [-0.00001] [-0.0048]
mean of dependent variable  0.792 0.208 0.089   0.064 0.029 0.044  
                          
WOMEN   (N=25,891)  (N=25,891)  (N=25,891) (N=25,891)  (N=25,891) (N=25,891) 
unemployment rate    0.0716 **  -0.0684 -0.116 ***  0.0306 -0.0274 -0.0958
  (0.028) (0.044) (0.043) (0.030) (0.041) (0.068)
     [0.0092]    [-0.0098]    [-0.0073]    [0.0013]    [-0.0009]    [-0.0025]   




Notes: (1) See Notes (1)-(3) under Table 2. 
(2) Sample is limited to the first month of being uninsured for each individual in the SIPP (2004-2010). 
(3) Dependent variables—column 1: indicator variable that equals 1 if the reason a person is uninsured is “too expensive, can’t afford” and 0 otherwise; column 2: indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the reason a person is uninsured is “HI not offered by employer” and 0 otherwise; column 3: indicator variable that equals 1 if the reason a person is 
uninsured is “not at job long enough to qualify” and 0 otherwise; column 4: indicator variable that equals 1 if the reason a person is uninsured is “job layoff, job loss, 
unemployment” and 0 otherwise; column 5: indicator variable that equals 1 if the reason a person is uninsured is “not eligible-part time or temp” and 0 otherwise; column 6: 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the reason a person is uninsured is “haven't needed health insurance” and 0 otherwise. 
(4) Other regressors are state fixed effects, year-specific fixed effects, highest grade completed, marital status, presence of children in the family, and age. 
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Table 5. Probability of Health Insurance Coverage, by Education 













MEN   
High school or less    (N=188,164) (N=188,164) (N=188,164) (N=188,164)  (N=188,164)
unemployment rate    -0.0709 *** -0.0727 ***  0.0061 -0.0640 ***  0.0402
  (0.023) (0.021) (0.035) (0.024) (0.047)
  [-0.0173] [-0.0180] [0.0010] [-0.0140] [0.0065]
mean of dependent variables  0.675 0.364 0.127 0.491 0.133  
                       
Some college    (N=161,132) (N=161,132) (N=161,132) (N=161,132)  (N=161,132)
unemployment rate    -0.0589 * -0.0155 0.0345 0.0034 -0.0673
  (0.035) (0.028) (0.036) (0.027) (0.043)
  [-0.0137] [-0.0018] [0.0029] [0.0008] [-0.0127]
mean of dependent variables  0.809 0.499 0.163 0.663 0.078  
                   
Bachelor's degree or more  (N=117,989) (N=117,989) (N=117,989) (N=117,989)  (N=117,989)
unemployment rate    -0.106 ** -0.0623 **  0.0432 -0.0536 0.0209
  (0.041) (0.028) (0.046) (0.037) (0.069)
  [-0.0214] [-0.0149] [0.0078] [-0.0112] [0.0052]
mean of dependent variables  0.922 0.674 0.131 0.805 0.034  
                    
WOMEN   
High school or less    (N=187,884) (N=187,884) (N=187,884) (N=187,884)  (N=187,884)
unemployment rate    -0.0034 -0.0073 0.0241 0.0063 -0.0158
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.031) (0.026) (0.033)
  [-0.0008] [-0.0010] [0.0055] [0.0012] [-0.0035]35 
 
mean of dependent variables  0.742 0.250 0.220 0.470 0.214  
                       
Some college    (N=190,050) (N=190,050) (N=190,050) (N=190,050)  (N=190,050)
unemployment rate    -0.0261 0.0049 -0.0115 -0.0066 -0.0231
  (0.024) (0.023) (0.032) (0.023) (0.037)
  [-0.0059] [0.0011] [-0.0026] [-0.0017] [-0.0043]
mean of dependent variables  0.844 0.368 0.0287 0.655 0.112  
                       
Bachelor's degree or more  (N=132,400) (N=132,400) (N=132,400) (N=132,400)  (N=132,400)
unemployment rate    -0.0776 -0.0074 -0.0625 * -0.0582 0.0314
  (0.051) (0.021) (0.034) (0.038) (0.046)
  [-0.0190] [-0.0013] [-0.0153] [-0.0118] [0.0077]
mean of dependent variables  0.937 0.526 0.292 0.818 0.034  
 
Notes: (1) See Notes (1)-(5) under Table 2.  
 (2) Other regressors are individual fixed effects, year-specific fixed effects, age, marital status, and presence of children in the family. 
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Table 6: Probability of Health Insurance Coverage, by Race 







MEN  (N=331,275) (N=  102,721) 
unemployment rate  -0.0615 **  -0.0840 *** 
(0.024) (0.030)
[-0.0154] [-0.0095]
mean of dependent variable  0.836   0.628  
         
WOMEN  (N=349,708) (N=122,699) 
unemployment rate  -0.0237 -0.0110
(0.018) (0.033)
[-0.0051] [-0.0027]
mean of dependent variable  0.871   0.717  
    
CHILDREN (N=244,452)  (N=135,216) 
unemployment rate  0.0617 **  0.0509
(0.025) (0.051)
   [0.0138]    [0.0124]   
mean of dependent variable  0.886   0.797  
Notes: (1) See Notes (1)-(4) under Table 2.  
 (2) A dependent variable in each column is an indicator variable that equals 1 if individual covered by health insurance from any source and 0 otherwise. 
 (3) Other regressors are individual fixed effects, year-specific fixed effects, age, highest grade completed, marital status, and presence of children in the family (The last three 
variables are not included in the regressions for children.). 
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Table 7: Probability of Health Insurance Coverage, by Age 
Logit Regression (with person- and year-specific fixed effects) 
 
  
18-34 years  35-49 years  50-64 years 
MEN  (N=165,372) (N=163,411)  (N=138,502) 
unemployment rate  -0.0574 ** -0.0683 ** -0.105 *** 
(0.027) (0.032) (0.039)
[-0.0134] [-0.0156] [-0.0250]
mean of dependent variable  0.693 0.810 0.870  
      
WOMEN  (N=175,088) (N=178,729)  (N=156,517) 
unemployment rate  -0.0076 -0.0277 -0.0526
(0.020) (0.027) (0.044)
[-0.0019] [-0.0069] [-0.0112]
mean of dependent variable  0.775   0.842   0.879  
                    
Notes: (1) See Notes (1)-(4) under Table 2.  
 (2) A dependent variable in each column is an indicator variable that equals 1 if individual covered by health insurance from any source and 0 otherwise. 
 (3) Other regressors are individual fixed effects, year-specific fixed effects, highest grade completed, marital status, and presence of children in the family (The last three variables 
are not included in the regressions for children.). 
 
 
 